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Future Reserves 2020: Perceptions of Cohesion, 
Readiness and Transformation in the British Army 
Reserve  
 
In 2013, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) outlined a profound reorganisation of the 
British Army Reserve, known as Future Reserves 2020 (FR20). To offset a 20 percent 
reduction in the regular army’s manning, FR20 sought to expand the Army Reserve (AR) 
from 19,000 to 30,000 by 2019. It also pledged £1.2 billion to better train, equip and 
integrate the force with the regular army so it could routinely deploy alongside it on 
operations (MoD, 2013). The cuts in regular strength were concentrated on the Combat 
Service Support (CSS, or logistics) component, and in particular the Royal Logistics 
Corps (RLC) and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). Indeed, one of the 
central organising tenets of this increasing reliance on the reserve component was that 
CSS reserve sub-units (companies) would now deliver much of the operational capability 
previously provided by their regular counterparts through better integration into the 
army’s deployment schedule (MoD 2013a, p.22; MoD, 2013b). While in many respects 
this attempt to transform the reserves mirrored that undertaken in the US (Griffith, 2009a), 
this new vision articulated a step-change in the prominence of the AR - and in particular 
its logistics component - in British defence policy, as well as a major transformation of a 
force that has traditionally been a strategic reserve. The regular army will therefore be 
more dependent on the ability of these elements to deploy quickly and perform effectively 
(Interview with senior officer, 16 January 2014). Unit cohesion and readiness are two 
standard measures of military effectiveness, and as a result increasing these factors in 
reserve logistic forces is important to the overall success of FR20. In short, through better 
equipment, training and integration with the regular army, FR20 would be expected to 
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make reserve units more cohesive, more ready and hence more effective on operations. 
Complimenting previous cohesion research, and to understand the effect of FR20 to date, 
this study therefore utilises a quantitative methodological approach to statistically 
examine perceptions of these, and the FR20 transformation more broadly, at the sub-unit 
level. Overall, it makes an original contribution of statistically significant new data on the 
AR and FR20. In doing so, it makes a number of distinct but linked arguments in relation 
to both the policy and the cohesion literature. Firstly, that reservist perceptions of 
cohesion, morale and readiness are relatively high, and are interrelated. Secondly, that 
although the FR20 reorganisation has not negatively impacted these factors, it has not 
significantly increased them either, raising questions about the policy’s effectiveness. 
Thirdly, that confidence in FR20 delivering its goals is decreasing over time. And finally, 
contrasting the literature on the importance of task cohesion in modern professional 
armies, that social bonds remain the main locus of cohesion in the reserves.  While these 
findings are hopefully interesting to policy makers, they also add new data and nuanced 
argument to scholarly debates about cohesion in reserve forces in general. . 
FR20’s focus on increasing reserve logistics capability provides the rationale and 
context for this paper’s quantitative examination of perceptions of cohesion, readiness, 
and organisational change in predominantly AR logistics units. In doing so, this paper 
presents the first ever quantitative research on perceptions of cohesion and readiness in 
the British AR. Throughout, it operates at both the individual and sub-unit levels of 
analysis respectively. It uses a number of complimentary quantitative approaches to 
examine distinct but related elements of the relationship between perceptions of cohesion, 
readiness and transformation in the AR. The paper therefore proceeds in four parts. 
Firstly, it utilises the ‘Standard Model’ of cohesion (Siebold, 2007) to examine reserve 
logisticians’ perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale. This gives a good baseline 
understanding of these issues. Then, in order to better understand the relationships 
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between the above factors,, advanced statistical analysis is undertaken to isolate 
background characteristics, and examine how reservists’ perceptions of cohesion 
influence readiness and morale. Thirdly, to directly address other important elements of 
FR20, perceptions of integration with the regulars and the effectiveness of FR20 are 
examined. Finally, to reflect more broadly on the data, selected units are examined to 
indicate how the FR20 reforms have impacted all these perceptions over time. In order to 
compliment previous qualitative research that found that social cohesion was more 
important in the AR than the regulars (Author, 2017), comparisons are made with data 
from regular units to elucidate differences between reserve and regular perceptions of 
cohesion.  
Measuring Perceptions of Cohesion 
Military group cohesion is complex and difficult to measure, with many definitional, 
methodological and level of analysis issues identified (Siebold & Kelly, 1988, Siebold 
1999, 2012; Beal et al., 2003; Wong et al., 2003; MacCoun et al., 2006; MacCoun & Hix, 
2010; Mullen & Copper, 1994). While these issues have resulted in lively debates 
(Siebold, 2007; King, 2007; Siebold, Crabb, Woodward & King, 2016) over the classical 
social psychology focus on attachment to the group and the more recent emphasis on 
military praxis, there is widespread acceptance among scholars that cohesion is essential 
for successful military group performance (King, 2013; MacCoun & Hix, 2010; Griffith, 
2007; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Siebold, 2011). However, despite the fact that AR 
conditions of service are different to the regulars - most notably in that the reserve is part 
time and deployment remains voluntary without a specific mobilisation order -  recent 
studies of the British Army Reserve (Dandeker et al., 2011 [which predominantly 
examines the AR during the 2000s]; Connelly, 2013 [which discusses cultural barriers to 
integration between regulars and reservists]; Edmunds et al. 2015 [the strategic and 
financial origins of FR20]; Author, 2016 [AR recruitment and retention]),there is no 
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existing quantitative study of cohesion and readiness in the British AR nor how this has 
been affected by FR20. Indeed, a review of the British reserve literature reveals a lack of 
recent sociological research, with most works predominantly historical (Beckett, 1982, 
2008; Cunningham, 1975; Kirke, 2008; Mitchinson, 2005, 2008; 2014). Walker’s study 
of the Territorial Army is the most sociologically informed of these, and he briefly noted 
the importance of ‘drill hall club’ social cohesion in the TA at the time (1990, 102).  The 
literature on US and European reserve forces has not examined their cohesion either  
(Ben-Ari & Lomksy-Feder, 2011; Griffith, 2009a; Griffith, 2009b; Griffith, 2011; 
Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008; Sion & Ben-Ari, 2005; Vest, 2013; Weber, 2011). Thus, this 
paper is well situated to contribute quantitative cohesion data to the reserves literature in 
general and on the post-FR20 Army Reserve in particular. 
This paper seeks to address these gaps by drawing on previous quantitative 
cohesion studies conducted in the US and other Western militaries to examine cohesion 
using the Standard Model. A useful classical definition of cohesion under the Standard 
Model has been provided by Guy Siebold: ‘The level of unit cohesiveness is defined as 
the degree to which mechanisms of social control operant in a unit maintain a structured 
pattern of social relationships between unit members, individually and collectively, 
necessary to achieve the unit's purpose’ (Siebold, 1999, p. 18). While King (2013) has 
challenged this view and used fieldwork and close qualitative arguments to add much 
needed nuance to the ‘cohesion debate’ - and his approach has also been applied to the 
Army Reserve elsewhere by this author, this paper uses the Standard Model to 
quantitavely measure cohesion as it provides and alternative but complimentary method 
of analysis that is especially useful for judging FR20’s effect and informing future policy.  
Following Siebold’s definition, three basic components of unit cohesion were 
originally identified: horizontal, vertical, and organisational. Each component was 
conceived of having an affective (emotional or feeling, known as social cohesion) aspect 
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and an instrumental (action or task, known as task cohesion) aspect. The components of 
small unit cohesion listed with their affective and instrumental aspects, respectively, are: 
(a) horizontal cohesion (peer bonding and teamwork); (b) vertical cohesion (leader caring 
and leader competence); and (c) organisational cohesion between soldiers and their units 
(pride and shared values, and attainment of needs and goals). More recently, a fourth 
component, institutional bonding – referring to the ties between group members and their 
wider branch of service and with similar aspects to the organisational component – has 
been argued to exist (Salo & Siebold, 2005). Within the Standard Model, leadership and 
shared organisational goals have been shown to be strongly related to organisational and 
peer bonding in particular (Bartone & Kirkland, 1994; Griffith, 2002). The components 
and their aspects are outlined below: 
Standard Model Cohesion Components  
 Affective Instrumental 
Horizontal Bonding Peer Bonding Teamwork 
Vertical Bonding Leader Caring Leader Competence 
Organisational Bonding Unit Values & Pride Unit Rules & Norms 
Institutional Bonding Army Values & Pride Army Rules & Norms 
Two main instruments, each involving questionnaire items asking soldiers about their 
perceptions of cohesion, are used to measure each aspect of each component. Siebold and 
Kelly’s (1988a) Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI) is considered to be the clearest way to 
measure cohesion at the platoon or sub-unit level. The 20-item questionnaire PCI is a 
shortened version of the 79-item Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (CPCQ) 
developed after extensive research on behalf of the US Army in 1986-87. It clusters items 
onto scales to measure each aspect of each component, with scales composed of two items 
each (Siebold & Kelly, 1988b). Analysis has shown that three factors are formed and 
there is one factor for each cohesion component. Interscale correlations range from .6 to 
.9, with the most typical being about .7. All of these components have been significantly 
correlated with subsequent group performance in numerous studies (Beal et al. 2003; 
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MacCoun & Hix, 2010; Mullen and Copper, 1994). The PCI and its variations have also 
been used to measure cohesion in surveys of units in the US, Israel, Norway, Canada and 
Finland (Gal, 1986; Salo, 2011; Siebold, 1996). The results of the PCI have matched 
commanders’ assessments of their unit’s cohesiveness, and have also been shown to have 
predictive validity with unit performance on training exercises (Siebold & Kelly, 1988a). 
A more recent study conducted on behalf of the MoD on the impact of the introduction 
of females into regular British Army combat units also utilised the longer CPCQ 
(Berkshire Consultancy, 2010). Therefore, both the CPCQ and the PCI are tried and tested 
methods of measuring unit cohesion; the shorter PCI is utilised in this study for brevity. 
Interestingly, a review of the Standard Model literature also revealed a very limited 
number of longitudinal studies of cohesion, of which Siebold’s (1996) examination of 
cohesion in US Army and National Guard units before, during and after their deployment 
on a Sinai peacekeeping mission was the only directly relevant. The other extant cohesion 
instrument is the questionnaire developed by James Griffith for his research in the US 
army, which he adapted from long-standing US survey research on unit cohesion 
(Griffith, 1998, p. 162). However, Griffith’s cohesion scales are arguably less accurate 
than the PCI for measuring cohesion, and a slightly adapted version of the PCI, modified 
to reflect the sub-unit level, is used in this study.  
While there is strong evidence for an association between cohesion and 
performance, the relationship is bi-directional, i.e positive performance can increase 
group cohesiveness. However, in this study, positive performance is viewed as a desired 
outcome of the FR20 reforms. Therefore, data reporting increases in sub-unit cohesion 
due to better performance does not invalidate but rather strengthens the findings. A further 
word on the specific methods used to assess cohesion and readiness in the selected sub-
units is required. As the proponents of the Standard Model admit themselves, the survey 
approach is limited to ascertaining unit members’ attitudes toward their units and their 
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perceptions of unit cohesion (Siebold, 2012). As such, the Standard Model offers a 
snapshot – albeit a highly-informed and complex one – of cohesion. While results of the 
Standard Model have been correlated to later collective performance, this approach does 
not assess the interactions which constitute collective performance themselves. Related 
to this is the concept of causality. While there may be some direct causal relationships, 
even the multiple regressions of the Standard Model cannot prove causality in cohesion 
– at best they indicate a moderate correlation (r = .4) between higher cohesion and higher 
performance (Siebold, 2012, p.50; Oliver, 1999), whilst the strongest relationships 
between the components of cohesion and cohesion itself – for example the effect of good 
leadership on the unit – can also only be moderately correlated (r =.6) (Siebold, 2012, 
p.50). Similarly the Standard Model is also open to critique because, as Hogg has 
identified, social psychology’s ‘group level theories readily tend to dissolve into theories 
of interpersonal processes’ (Hogg, 1992, p. 54); collective activities are often explained 
by numerous individual relationships, rather than looking at collective performance itself 
as King does. However, this paper recognises that neither quantitative nor qualitative 
analysis can provide a single definitive picture of the ‘whole’ of the FR20 and cohesion 
problem, and it simply aims to examine it from a different methodological and 
sociological perspective than existing works to enhance understanding. 
Measuring Perceptions of Readiness and Morale 
Military readiness can be defined as the ability of military forces to fight and meet the 
demands of the national military strategy. At the sub-unit level, readiness refers to the 
unit’s ability to carry out assigned missions. Despite numerous other definitions of morale 
(Gal, 1986, p. 549-551.), this study uses that provided by Ingraham and Manning, and 
also used by Reuven Gal: ‘A psychological state of mind, characterised by a sense of 
well-being based on confidence in the self and in primary groups (Ingraham & Manning, 
1981, p. 6). Griffith’s 1988 paper is very useful in terms of expanding on soldiers’ 
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perceptions of unit readiness and morale not directly addressed in the PCI. Specifically, 
it included 19 items from the Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire (CRMQ) 
developed by Gal to measure soldiers’ perceptions of group and individual readiness and 
morale in the Israeli Defence Forces (Gal, 1986), as well as other items previously used 
by the US military. Crucially, Griffith has shown that measures of sub-unit readiness, 
such as soldier morale, confidence in leaders, willingness to deploy, and confidence in 
weaponry and equipment are strongly influenced by perceptions of unit cohesion 
(Griffith, 1988, p. 162). Griffith also reported positive relationships between soldiers’ 
perceptions of cohesion and levels of individual morale. In order to ground the data in 
previous research and allow comparisons to be made with British AR soldiers, similar 
items measuring readiness and morale were adopted in this study. 
Finally, to gain an accurate picture of FR20’s impact to date on respondents’ sub-
units, it was necessary to generate a sub-set of items specifically addressing this issue. 
Other sub-sets consisted of items concerning reservists’ experiences of integrating with 
the regulars. 
Study Aims and Approach 
Based on this overview of the Standard Model, readiness and morale literature, the study 
set out to achieve the following: 
a. For the first time, analyse cohesion, and readiness and morale perceptions at 
from AR logisticians at the individual level. 
b. Isolate the influence of background characteristics on these perceptions and 
the relationship between cohesion, readiness and morale in British AR 
logisticians.  
9 
 
c. Examine these perceptions at the sub-unit level in order to identify differences 
the longitudinal impact of FR20 on perceptions of cohesion and readiness at 
the sub-unit level. 
d. Examine perceptions of integration with the regulars and the impact of the 
FR20 to ascertain the trajectory of the organisational transformation. 
Hypothesis 1: Following previous research, sub-units with higher cohesion should report 
higher levels of readiness and morale 
Hypothesis 2: Following previous research, reserve sub-units should display higher 
levels of affective bonding than their regular counterparts. 
Hypothesis 3: Reservists’ perceptions of cohesion and readiness should increase as FR20 
continues, as increased equipment, training, and opportunities are made available. 
Sample Description, Survey Design and Administration 
The survey was delivered twice in a 12-month period in April-June 2015, and 2016. The 
survey was endorsed and distributed in both paper and electronic formats by the chain of 
command. While soldiers were briefed that participation was voluntary, some may have 
been told to compete them during duty hours. Over 1,500 personnel from 43 units were 
approached to participate in 2015, and the study sample (n=427) was statistically 
representative of the reserve logistics population (n=4,617), according to a chi square 
goodness-of-fit test (1, n = 427) = .39, p = .53. Consistent with the AR in general, 13 
percent of the sample were female and 61 percent aged between 35-54, indicating 
considerably more females (9 percent) than, and a similar age profile to, the regular army 
(MoD, 2017b). While the survey may have captured reservists who were more willing to 
respond to surveys and hence have higher perceptions of cohesion, the response rate (29 
percent) was very similar to AR rates in the Ministry of Defence’s Reserve Continuous 
Attitudes Surveys (or ResCAS: MoD, 2018). ResCAS items have been refined and 
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developed over the years, including as a result of recent research (Author, 2016), but they 
do not directly address cohesion and readiness, nor perceptions of FR20. While ResCAS 
is endorsed by the chain of command and some units do parade their soldiers to fill out 
the questionnaires, overall the relatively low response rate is typical of the AR due to the 
part-time nature of their service and more limited access to defence IT systems. Indeed, 
in 2016 the sample (n=258) was too small to be statistically representative. Thus, three 
reserve sub-units with the highest response rates and internal validity during the study 
period – and a regular infantry and regular logistics sub-unit – were used for the regular-
reserve comparisons presented below. The findings concerning changes to cohesion since 
FR20 therefore represent an initial indication rather than a definitive picture. Importantly 
however, the results of the 2015 data are all representative of the wider reserve logistics 
population. 
The survey contained two sub-questionnaires: a modified PCI and the CRMQ 
questionnaire. It consisted of 60 items. Nine items asked respondents about their 
background characteristics, including which unit and sub-unit they belonged to, level of 
education achieved, marital status and time in service. This was followed by the 20 items 
of Siebold & Kelly’s PCI, with items adjusted to focus on the sub-unit, rather than the 
platoon. 14 items were taken from the CRMQ used by Gal (1986), Griffith (1998), and 
Vaitkus & Griffith (1990) respectively. Five further items asked soldiers about their levels 
of confidence in FR20 and its impact on their sub-unit. Finally, soldiers were asked if 
they had served with the Regulars in the last 12 months. Those who had proceeded to 
answer a further seven items on their experiences of integration with the Regulars. 
Possible answers were on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘Very Strongly 
Disagree/Very Low’; 2 = ‘Disagree/Low’; 3 = ‘Can’t Say/Moderate’; 4 = ‘Agree/High’; 
and 5 = ‘Strongly Agree/Very High’. This method of coding followed ResCAS, but 
differed to Siebold and Kelly’s. Using these already established questionnaires also 
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allowed comparison with previous research. Near the end of the survey a set of questions 
acted as a criteria scale for the earlier scales and as lie detectors.  
One major issue identified with longitudinal surveys in armies is the high turnover 
of personnel which can affect the stability of data.1 Unfortunately, as the MoD required 
the full anonymization of data, it was impossible to track individual soldiers. While this 
is a methodological weakness, stable response rates in the selected sub-units were able to 
mitigate this somewhat. Indeed, the moving of individuals away from the unit, or the 
introduction of new members is viewed as representative of the social life of the sub-unit, 
and the response rates in the selected sub-units were stable enough that weighting was 
not needed. Similarly, changes in leaders and deployments can also account for changes 
in cohesion and readiness. These were taken into account in the research. Any major 
changes in the sub-units circumstances were identified and used to inform the subsequent 
analysis.  
Analytic Approach 
Two levels of analysis are used in this study. A statistically significant sample of the 
RLC/REME population is utilised to illustrate perceptions in this wider group, while eight 
sub-units where survey response rates were the highest are selected to provide data at the 
sub-unit level of analysis. The sub-unit level was utilised as it provided more stable 
sample groups for longitudinal comparison.  
Method 
Details of the method employed in this study are in Annex A. A basic outline is provided 
here for coherence. Firstly, in order to prove that the PCI was statistically applicable to 
the sample, their responses to PCI items were tested through reliability analysis at the 
individual item and scale levels. Similarly, the reliability of the PCI scales was proven 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to Guy Siebold for this point. 
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through Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Details of the cohesion components and the 
PCI items that made each component are detailed in Table 1 below.  
Table 1 here 
Then, to generate a total cohesion score to enable easier longitudinal comparison 
at the individual level, a scale (‘Total Cohesion’) was created to include all the PCI scales. 
The means and standardisation deviations were then calculated to give a base 
understanding of perceptions of cohesion at the individual level. Next, EFA and 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) identified two factors in the 14 items taken from the 
CRMQ: these created scales labelled ‘Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale’ and ‘Personal 
Confidence’. Once all these scales were created, it was necessary to statistically isolate 
the relationship between background characteristics, cohesion, sub-unit readiness and 
morale, and personal confidence outcomes. In order to determine cohesion’s unique 
contribution to these outcomes, separate multiple regressions were then conducted, first 
with only background characteristics included and then with scores from the Total 
Cohesion scale (see Table 3) added and regressed onto both the Sub-Unit Readiness and 
Morale, and Personal Confidence scales. 
Results 
Individual Perceptions of Cohesion 
The means and standard deviations for the sample cohesion scores at the individual level 
are presented in Table 2 below. The means of each of the cohesion components present 
the average score at the individual soldier level on each of the scales. The standard 
deviation shows the amount of variance from the mean that should be expected. As each 
scale was created from two items, the mean score throughout the 2015 PCI survey was 4 
out of 5 -‘Agree/High’ - for each item giving a combined score of around 8 for the two 
items, indicating relatively strong perceptions across all the components of cohesion. 
Overall, these reservists’ perceptions of cohesion were therefore positive in 2015. 
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Table 2 here 
Of note is that the Organisational Bonding, Needs scale recorded the lowest 
scores, indicating that reservists are less satisfied with their amount of time off and social 
events than other areas of cohesion. More positively, the highest recorded scores 
concerned the Horizontal Bonding, Instrumental, scale which records perceptions of 
lower ranks’ levels of team work. This finding was supported by high scores in the 
Organisational Bonding, Affective, Pride scale which measures lower ranks’ pride in their 
sub-unit and their positive contribution to sub-unit missions. Both Vertical Bonding 
scales also displayed high means, indicating that leadership in the sub-units is generally 
perceived as strong and that the relationship between ranks is good. In terms of the 
renewed effort to inculcate army values across the integrated force (MoD, 2015), the 
results indicate that this is not a problem area among the sample, with ‘Agree’ the most 
common response to items concerning leaders setting the example in regards to values, 
and lower ranks upholding and supporting these values. Similarly, at slightly lower levels, 
the Organisational Bonding, Instrumental, Anomie scale shows that perceptions of 
discipline are relatively high. 
Individual Perceptions of Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale 
This section presents the sample’s 2015 responses to a selection of the sub-unit readiness 
and morale items from the CRMQ. Again, overall, the results showed relatively strong 
perceptions of readiness and morale. About 33 percent of the sample thought that their 
sub-unit’s readiness was in the high categories, 48 percent in moderate, and 17 percent in 
the low categories. The distribution of scores was slightly skewed toward higher 
perceptions of sub-unit readiness, indicating more positive attitudes. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the majority reported moderate over high readiness is noteworthy, especially 
when compared to the PCI scales in which the average response was usually in the 
‘Agree/High’ category. One explanatory factor could be that as members of reserve sub-
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units, these soldiers are more aware of their more limited readiness, and of their sub-unit’s 
tiered readiness as determined by the Army2020 training and deployment cycle. 
Interestingly, soldiers’ perceptions of their individual readiness to fight if necessary was 
significantly higher (49 percent responded ‘High’) than perceptions of sub-unit readiness. 
Almost 70 percent of respondents said that their sub-unit’s togetherness was in the high 
categories, while 61 percent said that the same of their sub-unit’s skills in its main military 
role. Taken together, these results provide positive indications of aspects of readiness that 
complement the affective and instrumental results of the PCI.  
A similar number of respondents (66 percent) also stated that their sub-unit’s 
morale was in the high categories. This is another important baseline statistic, and coupled 
with the fact that only three percent rated their sub-unit morale as ‘Low’ and none as 
‘Very Low’ indicates high levels of sub-unit morale across the sample. This is especially 
positive given the organisational changes many of the sub-units have experienced as a 
result of FR20.  High levels of personal morale were also recorded (71 percent in high 
categories), in stark contrast to recent data on morale in the regular army (MoD, 2016).  
Supporting the PCI scale scores, generally high levels of individual confidence in 
sub-unit readiness across a number of other variables were recorded. This included high 
levels confidence in the sub-unit’s major equipment systems (56 percent), although of 
note is that on average 35 percent said their confidence in this regard was ‘Moderate’. In 
terms of individuals’ confidence in their ability to do their job on operations given the 
correct pre-deployment training, 87 percent reported ‘High’ or ‘Very High’ levels of 
confidence. 83 percent reported similar levels of confidence in the ability of their sub-
unit to perform on operations given sufficient pre-deployment training.  Thus, morale and 
readiness in Army Reserve logistics units appears relatively strong. 
Background Characteristics as Predictors of Cohesion, Readiness, and Personal 
Confidence 
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In order to isolate background characteristics, and understand if and how cohesion 
influenced Sub-unit Readiness and Morale, and Personal Confidence a number of 
multiple regressions were conducted on the 2015 data. The results of these separate 
regressions, each corresponding to one of the above outcomes, are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3 here 
In terms of cohesion, background characteristics explained only three percent of 
the variance, indicating that these have only a minor impact on perceptions of cohesion. 
There was a relatively minor but significant difference between sub-units’ perceptions of 
cohesion (-.15, Sig =.19). This is expected and is significant to the wider population. It 
also confirms that soldiers’ own experiences of their sub-units are more important in 
shaping their perceptions of cohesion than any other background characteristics, 
including education, which has previously been shown to have a highly significant 
predictive ability with AR logistics soldier satisfaction (Author, 2016). Further supporting 
previous evidence that better educated soldiers are less satisfied with reserve service, 
there was a relatively strong association between higher levels of education and lower 
perceptions of cohesion at relatively significant levels (-.62, Sig = .06).  
With Total Cohesion excluded from the regression, the most important 
background characteristic was sub-unit, which had a small but significant (-.07, Sig 
=.037) association with perceptions of cohesion and readiness. With Total Cohesion 
added, the total variance explained (R2) by the model jumped from seven percent to 46 
percent. This result compliments those of previous studies in combat forces, and 
highlights that reservists’ perceptions of sub-unit cohesion is very strongly related to their 
sub-unit readiness and personal morale. This was also borne out by the relatively strong 
association at highly significant levels (.34, Sig = .00) between cohesion, and readiness 
and morale. This supports hypothesis 1.  
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In terms of Personal Confidence, with the Total Cohesion scale added to the 
regressions, the R2 of the model also jumped from 4 percent to 38 percent, further 
supporting hypothesis 1, and indicating that perceptions of cohesion are also very 
important in explaining personal confidence. Indeed, as expected, cohesion had the 
strongest and most significant association with personal confidence (.15, Sig =.00). Being 
better educated was also negatively associated with personal confidence at significant 
levels (-.13, Sig = .05). This is likely due to the fact that better educated soldiers are more 
critical of their own abilities and the provision of personal equipment. It also supports 
previous research showing that better educated soldiers are less satisfied with most 
aspects of reserve service (Author, 2016). 
Sub-Unit Perceptions of Cohesion 
The next research question was to examine the difference in perceptions of cohesion 
between certain sub-units at the collective sub-unit level of analysis. In order to do this, 
eight sub-units were selected from those with the highest response rates expressed as a 
percentage of their average attendance. Annex A details the eight sub-units that were 
chosen for further analysis, and the organisational changes certain sub-units are 
undergoing as a result of FR20. The relatively low numbers of respondents in the sub-
units impacted their confidence intervals, but this is to be expected for smaller groups. 
Next, the selected sub-units’ responses to the PCI scales and the Total Cohesion 
scale were examined, as shown in Table 4. Most of the sub-units displayed high levels of 
cohesion across all the components, and the average total cohesion score was 80/100. 
This is a good baseline metric for understanding cohesion in these sub-units, and, given 
the scale of the organisational change some of these sub-units have undergone, this a 
positive outcome that may indicate that perceptions of cohesion have not been too 
adversely affected by FR20. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the PCI identified that 
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reservists’ satisfaction with time off and time for social events had the lowest of all the 
component scores.  
Interestingly, although only indicative results, neither the regular logistics sub-
unit, nor the regular infantry sub-unit had higher ‘Total Cohesion’ scores than their 
reserve counterparts. However, when sub-unit results on the separate bonding scales are 
examined a number of patterns emerge. Firstly, both regular units’ low scores on the 
Organisational Bonding Instrumental, Needs, scale are important as they are significantly 
lower than the reserve units and have heavily negatively impacted these units’ total 
cohesion score. Clearly, these regular units perceive more strongly that they do not have 
enough time to spend with families or socialise together, highlighting the increased 
workload associated with full-time service since the cuts to regular manning. Secondly 
and supporting hypothesis 2, both regular sub-units reported lower perceptions of 
Horizontal and Vertical Affective Bonding, and higher perceptions of the Horizontal and 
Vertical Instrumental, and Anomie scales than the mean scores for the reserve logistics 
sub-units. While this would initially appear to indicate that there are lower bonds between 
regular soldiers and their leaders, in fact when taken in tandem with the regulars’ higher 
instrumental component scores, this may suggest the greater importance of task cohesion 
and an awareness of the discipline system in the regulars. This supports hypothesis 2 and 
previous research on the nature of British AR cohesion (Author, 2017). 
Table 4 here  
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Sub-Unit Perceptions of Readiness and Morale 
In order to examine collective perceptions of Readiness and Morale and Personal 
Confidence at the sub-unit level, the mean and standard deviations for the eight selected 
sub-units in 2015 are presented in Table 5 below. Of note are the relatively high levels of 
sub-unit readiness and morale recorded amongst the selected sub-units, supporting the 
cohesion evidence presented above. The average score per item on the scale was 4, a very 
similar score to those recorded on the PCI. Personal Confidence scores were 
comparatively lower than those on the Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale scale. As expected 
given its low cohesion score, and ongoing re-roling, RLC 5 recorded the lowest readiness 
and morale score and the second lowest personal confidence score, highlighting the 
sensitivity of the PCI to unit context. 
Table 5 here 
 
Interestingly, and again only indicative given the small sample size, results for the 
regular infantry sub-unit indicated much higher perceptions of Sub-Unit Readiness and 
Morale, and Personal Confidence than either its regular logistics counterpart, or those in 
the reserves. While this result needs to be corroborated by further data, one possible 
explanatory factor is this infantry unit’s higher readiness demands, and/or the greater 
awareness of readiness and morale as a result of the increased collective training burden 
associated with infantry units as discussed in Author (2017).  
Individual Experiences of FR20 and Integration with the Regulars 
The next section examines individual responses to the five items concerning experiences 
of FR20 to date, and the 12 items addressing experiences of integration with the regulars. 
Overall, the results showed lower levels of agreement than with the cohesion, readiness 
and morale items. There were generally higher levels in the ‘Can’t Say’ category, and 
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higher percentages disagreed. While the ‘Agree’ category generally remained the second 
most popular choice amongst the sample, indicating that perceptions of the impact of the 
transformation are relatively positive, the fact that the ‘Strongly Agree’ percentages were 
relatively low indicate there is more to be desired from the reforms at this time.  
Perhaps the most important baseline statistic concerning the impact of FR20 to 
date is recorded in the item concerning respondents’ optimism that the policy will increase 
their sub-unit’s capability. In 2015, responses to this item were skewed toward positive 
scores, indicating overall optimism that the reforms will prove successful. On average 54 
percent said they agreed with the proposition, and 30 percent ‘Couldn’t Say’. In terms of 
perceptions of sub-units becoming better at their job as a result of FR20, 43 percent of 
respondents stated they ‘Couldn’t Say’, while 38 percent agreed.  
In terms of the introduction of better equipment as result of FR20, only 32 percent 
of both cap badges agreed with the proposition. REME reservists were significantly less 
positive than their RLC colleagues about the introduction of better equipment as a result 
of FR20, and this item recorded some of the least positive results in the entire survey, 
suggesting that the experience of better equipment into sub-units as a result of FR20 has 
been mixed. In terms of FR20 delivering better integration with the regulars during 
training, just over a third agreed this had occurred in their sub-unit. However, there were 
relatively high levels of mid-point scores, and 24 percent disagreed. Supported by other 
results above, and the evidence presented by Author (2016), this indicates that 
opportunities to train with the regulars could be increased further.  
In 2015, the items concerning experiences of integration with the regulars over 
the last 12 months had a smaller sample size (n= approx. 210) as a result of the exclusion 
of soldiers who did not have relevant experience. The first item asked whether integration 
with the regulars had increased soldiers’ confidence in their individual skills. 55 percent 
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were in the agree categories. Slightly lower levels of agreement (46 percent) with the 
regulars’ impact on sub-unit competence were recorded, with higher levels in the ‘Can’t 
Say’ category (44 percent). 65 percent agreed that integrating with the regulars was a 
valuable experience, while on average 68 percent agreed they liked working with the 
regulars. Both of these items recorded some of the highest levels of agreement in this 
subset. 
Sub-Unit Level Perceptions of Integration with Regulars and the Impact of FR20 
In order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the 12 items concerning 
respondents’ Experiences of the Impact of FR20 and Integration with the Regulars, it was 
necessary to conduct another EFA, detailed in Annex A. Once the factors were identified 
and scales confirmed, to examine the relationship between background characteristics and 
the Integration with Regulars and Impact of FR20 scales, separate multiple regression 
analyses, each corresponding to one of these outcomes, were conducted. Predictor 
variables were soldier background characteristics and sub-unit. In terms of experiences 
of working with the regulars, overall there were no major differences between units. 
Single soldiers were strongly associated with better experiences of working with the 
regulars at moderate levels of significance to the wider population (1.57, Sig = .05). This 
is similar to other scale scores indicating single soldiers’ higher perceptions of morale 
and readiness and could conceivably be due to higher levels of motivations and fewer 
conflicts between reserve service and family life.  
In terms of soldiers’ experiences of the impact of FR20 to date, higher ranks were 
associated at high levels of significance with lower scores on this scale (-.15, Sig = .036). 
This is to be expected as higher ranks will have more military experience and arguably a 
wider organisational context within which to compare the current reforms. Next, to 
illustrate how the selected sub-units scored on the Integration with Regulars and Impact 
of FR20 scales, the means and standard deviations were calculated. These are presented 
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in Table 6 below. The average sub-unit score on Integration with Regulars was 25.5 out 
of a possible 35, with the response per item score (3.6) indicating that the average answer 
was slightly weighted toward ‘Agree’. This indicates that most sub-units thought that 
integration with the regulars was a positive experience, and clearly some sub-units had 
better experiences than others, as detailed above. Of particular note is that although (or 
perhaps in spite of the fact that) RLC 5 recorded lower levels of cohesion, readiness and 
morale, and personal confidence, it recorded the highest score on this scale. This is very 
interesting as it suggests that positive experiences of the regulars are not necessarily 
influenced by perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale, and personal confidence. In 
short, these experiences may be viewed as a separate factor, removed from sub-unit 
climate, by sub-unit members. Meanwhile, there were generally lower levels of 
agreement that FR20 was having positive impacts on the selected sub-units. The average 
sub-unit score on Impact of FR20 was 16.7 out of 25, with the response per item score 
(3.3) indicating that the average answer was weighted toward ‘Can’t Say’. Crucially, this 
indicates that respondents in the selected sub-units remained very much undecided about 
the real impact of FR20 on their sub-units in 2015. 
Table 6 here 
Perceptions of Cohesion, Readiness and Morale, and FR20 over time 
A major research interest was to ascertain if sub-unit perceptions of cohesion, readiness 
and morale, and experiences of FR20, were changing as FR20 progressed. In terms of the 
three sub-units selected for longitudinal comparison between 2015-2016, it is noteworthy 
that the mean total cohesion scores remained relatively stable, but that in one sub-unit this 
had dropped by about 4 percent. A Paired Samples T Test revealed that the difference in 
cohesion scores over time in these three reserve sub-units was just at the limits of 
statistical significance (sig=.41, t=.72, df=73). This indicates that cohesion scores have 
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changed by a small but significant amount in both directions and supports the qualitative 
data on this subject (Author, forthcoming).      
In terms of these three sub-units scores on the Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale, 
and Personal Confidence scales, there were no significant changes in the mean in either 
(Sig=. 65, t= .48, df =77; Sig=.81, t=. 2.4, df =82, respectively). This further supports the 
qualitative data previously referenced and the quantitative cohesion data above, that there 
was little significant change as a result of FR20 between 2015-16. Although these results 
are indicative only, they do suggest that FR20 is failing to increase cohesion and readiness 
and morale in a significant manner, contrary to hypothesis 3.  
Conversely, a paired T Test with the 2016 data for the three selected sub-units 
indicated significant positive increases in the mean scores (8.79 at a 95% confidence 
level, Sig=.00, t=11.25, df=40) in these units’ attitudes to Integration with the Regulars 
since 2015. As such, this data supports other data (Author, forthcoming) that FR20 is 
increasing reservists’ exposure to the regulars. Conversely, there was a decrease in 
confidence that FR20 would deliver increased sub-unit capability by the time of the 
policy’s projected completion, at similar levels of significance (-9.81 mean, Sig= .00, t= 
-8.22, df =32).  
Discussion 
In terms of individual perceptions of cohesion, the average 2015 score of 4/5 is an 
important baseline statistic for understanding British AR logistics cohesion. It indicates 
that, in a statistically significant sample and allowing for differences in coding, levels of 
perceived cohesion amongst AR reservists are similar to those recorded in Siebold and 
Kelly’s research, and subsequent studies of both regulars and reservists (Siebold, 1996).  
In terms of informing policy, this indicates that in general, and despite substantial 
organisational changes within some of the sub-units surveyed, these soldiers’ perceptions 
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of their sub-unit’s cohesion were relatively high in 2015. Indeed, they were comparable 
to those recorded in regular forces. This is interesting when taken in conjunction with the 
limited previous research on reserve cohesion as it suggests that reservists may not assess 
their individual cohesion as lower than their regular counterparts, despite obvious 
organisational differences in training time, access to equipment and levels of readiness.  
 At the same individual level of analysis, an examination of the components of 
cohesion revealed that the highest scores were recorded in lower ranks’ perceptions of 
team work. This finding was supported by high scores in scales measuring lower ranks’ 
pride in their sub-unit, and their positive contribution to sub-unit missions. Clearly, the 
fact that two of these three high-scoring scales measure instrumental or task-oriented 
cohesion, rather than affective cohesion, is interesting as it suggests that working together 
to complete tasks (and hence fulfil operational requirements) is where these reservists 
perceive their sub-units are most cohesive. However, when indicatively compared with 
regular sub-units it is clear that perceptions of social cohesion are higher in reserve sub-
units than in regular units, while those of task cohesion are lower. Again, this research is 
not conclusive given the small regular sample size and further research is needed to prove 
hypothesis 2, but the initial evidence does support the qualitative data (Author, 2017) that 
social cohesion is more important in AR logistics service. 
In terms of reserve logistics sub-unit readiness, in 2015 the majority rated it 
moderate, but two thirds rated their sub-unit’s morale as high. Only a small percentage 
rated their morale as low. The strong individual perceptions of Sub-Unit Readiness and 
Moral and Personal Confidence complement the cohesion scores and are particularly 
interesting given the introduction of the tiered and cyclical force readiness structure for 
the reserves under FR20. The results indicate that these reservists were confident in 2015 
that the new system would provide the requisite training for them, and their sub-unit, to 
deliver to the required standard on operations. This is a positive indicator, and it appears 
24 
 
to be an interesting wider endorsement of the broader FR20 tiered readiness plan for the 
reserves. The slightly lower levels of individual confidence in the sub-unit’s ability to do 
job on operations compared to their own ability complements the other results on 
readiness and morale, where individual scores are usually higher than at the sub-unit level. 
This is supported by previous research and is likely reflective of the greater number of 
factors that impact at this level, including personalities, degree of training of other 
members, unit leadership etc.  
Overall, the statistical analyses to isolate background characteristics showed that 
these explained very little variance. The examination of cohesion’s relationship with 
readiness and morale underscored the importance of cohesion in explaining perceptions 
of the both of these, and personal confidence. Supporting previous research and 
hypothesis 1, levels of cohesion amongst reservists explained the most variance in 
perceptions of sub-unit readiness and morale, and personal confidence. This underscores 
the importance of cohesion in delivering military capability, not only in regular forces, 
but also as this study proves, in the reserves. Nevertheless, an important finding from the 
background characteristics isolation the negative effect that more education has on 
perceptions of both cohesion and personal confidence. When combined with previous 
research on recruitment and retention in the AR (Author, 2016), there is clear and growing 
evidence that targeting this group could lead to better satisfaction, retention, and cohesion 
across the reserve population. 
The aggregated sub-unit level perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale were 
also high, at 80/100, indicating that despite some very serious organisational changes in 
some sub-units, overall perceptions of these variables remained high in 2015. This was a 
good outcome for the FR20 policy in general and shows that sub-unit cohesion did not 
appear to have been too adversely affected by the reforms at that time. Similarly, the 
sample found experiences of integrating with the regulars in training rewarding, although 
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given the smaller number of reservists who had done so, and their responses, opportunities 
to do so could be increased. Nevertheless, in 2015 just over half the sample agreed that 
FR20 would eventually increase their sub-unit’s capability. Generally, when compared to 
scores on other scales, there were less positive perceptions about the impact of FR20 to 
date, and there was clear dissatisfaction with the provision of new equipment it has 
promised. Related to this, in 2015, most respondents were undecided about the actual 
impact of FR20 on their sub-unit. 
Indeed, more important to understanding FR20’s current trajectory is its impact 
over time, and the 2016 picture, although more limited in terms of its representativeness, 
did paint a less positive picture. The three sub-units selected for longitudinal comparison 
registered significantly lower levels of confidence in FR20 increasing their sub-units’ 
capability, indicating that the policy is struggling to have a major positive impact. 
Importantly, it indicated that in these sub-units examined longitudinally, confidence in 
FR20 delivering on its aims has declined since 2015. More data is needed, but the 
evidence suggests that the policy may be running out of steam. 
Similarly, there was only a small (but statistically significant) change in cohesion, 
and no significant changes to perceptions of readiness and morale, nor personal 
confidence in the three sub-units, thereby raising questions about the overall effectiveness 
of FR20 in delivering more capable reserve logistics units. Contrary to hypothesis 3, it 
appears that FR20 is struggling to significantly improve AR soldiers’ perceptions of their 
cohesion, morale and readiness and hence sub-unit capabilities. Conversely, the 2016 data 
indicated that FR20 had significantly increased reservists’ perceptions of integration with 
the regulars. This likely reflects more exposure to the regulars over time as a result of 
FR20’s integration drive, and positive experiences during this increased exposure. 
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Conclusion 
This article set out to examine reservist logisticians’ perceptions of cohesion, readiness 
and morale, and experiences of FR20 in a representative sample of reserve logistics sub-
units. Overall, it found that perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale remained 
relatively high in these sub-units. This represents the first investigation of these variables 
in the British AR, and is a good baseline indicator that in 2015-16 AR units remained 
relatively confident of their ability to provide the capability required of them if called 
upon to do so. In terms of hypotheses 1, the data found that perceptions of cohesion 
explained the most variance in the latter two variables, and given the separation of these 
variables using CFA, it provides further evidence of the importance of cohesion on other 
unit effectiveness indicators. This supports Siebold’s (2011) and Grifftth’s (2007) 
analyses of the importance of cohesion in explaining other factors linked to military 
effectiveness. Similarly, this paper has shown that the PCI is an accurate and easily 
modifiable tool for assessing British AR cohesion, and could easily be adopted by units 
themselves to identify possible issues. Finally, in accordance with hypothesis 2, it 
provided some evidence that reserve units generally report higher levels of affective 
bonding than their regular counterparts. This is especially interesting when placed in the 
context of King’s arguments on the rising importance of task cohesion in professional 
militaries, as it suggests that due to the part-time nature of reserve service with therefore 
fewer opportunities to train collectively, social bonds may still provide the primary locus 
of cohesion in the reserves. This also supports previous qualitative research on this matter 
(Author, 2017). 
In terms of FR20, although some of the data presented here is only indicative and 
the limitations of the small sample size in 2016 must be acknowledged, overall it does 
suggest that the policy is delivering better integration with the regulars for these 
reservists. As other research has shown, this integration is driving the professionalisation 
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of the AR and the inculcation of regular values into the force. On a similarly positive 
note, perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale, remained relatively high. But the 
picture is mixed. FR20 has clearly failed to have a large and significant impact on 
cohesion, readiness and morale, and personal confidence in some of these sub-units to 
date, despite the policy being three years into its projected five-year lifespan when the 
second tranche of data was taken. Indeed, what is significant is that sub-units’ confidence 
in their ability to deliver the capability required by FR20 appears to have dropped over 
time, raising questions as to the longer-term trajectory of the policy. Nevertheless, future 
research is needed to confirm this trend. Areas of particular interest include generating 
another data set on current perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale and the impact 
of FR20 as it ends its projected lifespan, and further large n comparative data on the 
differences forces in the strength of response to the affective/instrumental bonds between 
regular and reserve forces.  
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